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INTRODUCTION

TO THE

T H E O R Y

O F T H E

HUMAN MIND.

K Usher J.

By J. USSHER, Author of CLIO.

The SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N,

Printed for T. DAVIES, in Russel-street,
Covent-Garden. MDCCLXXIII.

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THEORY

OF THE

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By J. CUSHER, Author of CLIO.

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T H E
P R E F A C E.

IN the contest carried on for some years past between the defenders of christianity and Deists, the latter always appealed to philosophy, and under that shelter speciously defended themselves: their procedure obliged the champions of christianity to follow and attack them within the verge of philosophy; but by the occasional shifting of principles and systems, and a dexterous use of equivocal language, the

dispute became a kind of chase thro' a labyrinth, in which the retreats were endless, and the victory always incompleat: this observation made me wish, the principles of philosophy that enter into the dispute were more clear, limited, and decisive. It seemed reasonable to me to conclude, that true religion cannot be inconsistent with true philosophy; that if men be obliged to any duties in a state of nature, such duties are the indubitable laws of God, and they cannot differ essentially from the duties the Deity is pleased to require of us by revelation. Hence I imagined that the plan of the mind of man, if attentively observed, and faithfully delineated, must give light into the intention and end of his creation; at least the eager desire of each party

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to reconcile philosophy to their own religious opinions, demonstrates the secret sense mankind have of the necessity that true philosophy should witness for religion. Full of these reflections, I set out in an enquiry into the nature of the human mind, with a view if possible, to discover some traces of duty and natural religion; and to try if any principles may be solidly established in public view, which may prove decisive in the dispute between christians and deists.

Christians may object to the trial of religion by philosophy, on account of the weakness and uncertainty of human reason; but deists can have no objections to it, without bidding defiance to all equitable principles of decision; for philosophy is their only luminary to direct them, and
their

their only resource for the defence of their opinions : in fact, this is bringing the dispute to that tribunal they themselves set up against revelation.

Having given some account of my general design, my present business with my reader is to inform him, that when I made some little progress in my observations on the human mind, I found myself involved in objections and difficulties that arose from ambiguities, and from a fraudulent use of language, peculiar to modern philosophy: I found general expressions passed current for names of simple ideas that come to the imagination from sensation; and this cheat made use of to favour false principles, of the most pernicious influence to virtue and reason; and I found

found metaphorical expressions adopted in philosophy, for the sake of making a deceitful transition from the metaphorical, to a proper sense. The confusion and perverse train of reasoning occasioned by these abuses of language, obliged me, before I could proceed in the theory of man, to clear away the rubbish of equivque, by way of introduction; which I have attempted in the two first sections of the following sheets. I afterwards added a few thoughts on human instincts, which make the third section; but having observed upon a review that I unhinged many settled opinions, and broke up so much of the foundations of modern philosophy, I thought proper to stop there, and publish the introduction apart, in order to take
the

the sense of my cotemporaries upon these my reflections, before I proceed any further.

There is one *postulatum* I expect to be acknowledged by my candid reader, at our setting out; it is, "That
 " there is a possibility that the Body
 " of the learned may be imposed
 " upon by the present mode of
 " philosophy; and that false principles in this age we live in, may have
 " their currency from the stamp and
 " fashion of the times." The various revolutions in the systems of the learned, have abundantly proved the possibility I spoke of; in consequence of which, I hope my impartial reader will grant me without difficulty, that no names, or systems, however respectable, should be allowed

lowed any weight against evidence or demonstration. I cannot indeed help owning, that the obscurity of the writer, and the great names I have to contend with, make a contrast. that with a little irony may be wrought into a smart and humourous critique: but this is the very thing I protest against, since that mode of argument can never be satisfactory, that may be urged equally against every author who ever ventured to think in a new tract, and that may serve to defend every system however fantastic, that happens to be in fashion.

lowest and highest evidence
of human nature. I cannot think
it probable that the majority of
men, and we have seen I have
in common with many a common
man, are in the least degree
capable of the noblest
actions. I have seen many
men who are capable of the
most noble actions, but I
have also seen many who are
capable of the most base
actions. I have seen many
who are capable of the most
noble actions, but I have
also seen many who are
capable of the most base
actions. I have seen many
who are capable of the most
noble actions, but I have
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actions.

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6 The

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A N

INTRODUCTION, &c.

SECT. I.

Of pleasure, pain, self-love, and self-interest.

1. *P*LEASURE and pain are general terms, consequently they have no sensible or determinate idea annexed to them, no more than the terms *vegetable, tree, fruit, colour,* or any other word

B of

of general import. To explain this matter a little, I need only repeat some common-place principles, that are to be met with in every writer who has treated of the conceptions of the human understanding. They observe, that the imagination is only capable of conceiving the ideas that have been impressed on it by the senses, or by a perception of the operations of the mind itself; whence it is evident, that the whole stock of its ideas must consist in particulars, that have been fixed upon the memory by experience.

2. In the formation of language, it was easy to give proper names to objects mutually known, to *William* and *Thomas*, to *Cowper's-hill* and the *Thames*. But it often became necessary, to treat of objects with which the hearers had no acquaintance. Here then would lye an
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insuperable obstacle to the further progress of language, if general similarities in the objects of nature, that are obvious at the first glance, had not smoothed the difficulty, by parcelling them out into distinct classes to the imagination, and thus giving a foundation to general terms. This advance in language required little trouble or invention ; for in looking over the particular objects that occurred, it was impossible to pass without notice, the striking similarity or likeness that subsists between several individuals, and that serves to cast them into separate tribes or species. This general similitude found in nature became a model to men, according to which they formed specific names, each of which, on that account, comprehends a *sort* or *species*, and distinguishes them from all others, such as the words *cow*, *horse*, *sheep*, *oak*, *ash*, *elm* ; one oak tree is so

like to another in its leaves, fruit, bark, timber, and growth, and so unlike to an ash or elm, as to give occasion to the general name *oak*, under which that whole species are distinguished; and thus specific names were formed for the different and separate tribes of nature. After the invention of general names, the communication between men became easy; the carpenter could send his servant to the wood, and tell him what kind of tree to fell for his purpose; and the traveller, speaking of the Alps and the Euphrates, is well understood, when he tells you that the first is a chain of *mountains*, and the last a *river*. If language had stood at the first step, and only expressed particular objects, human knowledge must have been for ever in an infant state; but by the help of specific terms, men are enabled to transmit to posterity, maxims and observations that shall hold

hold good, as long as the species continue on earth.

3. Man was so far directed in the formation of language by the obvious plan of the creation; but his fruitful invention carried him yet further, where his directions were looser, and less distinct. He united several species under a more general name, as oak, ash, elm, &c. under the more extensive word *tree*; kine, sheep, horse, under the word *cattle*; by which management were parcelled out the objects of nature, into several great wards or divisions, called generals or *genus*; each of which comprehends several species, as each species takes in various particulars; whence it is manifest, that general expressions do not serve to represent or determine any object of nature, nor any idea we receive from the senses, which are always particulars; but they

they are useful in language, for their property of being applicable to any one of divers species out of view, and for determining the great ward, or division in nature, to which the particular object or species belongs. You may say those general expressions represent *abstract ideas* if you will ; all that is necessary to my purpose, is, to render it clear, that general or abstract terms, call them as you please, do not represent any particular objects existing in nature, but are mere creatures of the mind, formed to class the objects of perception into platoons or divisions, for the sake of perspicuity and order, and the convenience of conveying general knowledge.

4. Having premised these trite observations, I proceed to shew that *pleasure* and *pain* are terms of general import, and therefore have no particular distinct repre-

representation in the mind. When I speak of pleasure I enjoyed yesterday, you are wholly at a loss for a distinct conception answerable to it: you may search your imagination, but you will find no sensible idea annexed to the word *pleasure*, until, from the different species of pleasures, whereof you have had experience, one particular kind be singled out. You may apply that general word to the charms of music, to a delicious banquet, to exercise, or rest; but the charms of music, the pleasing taste of food, agreeable exercise, or rest after fatigue, are as different species, and as distant in their relation to each other, as oak, ash, and elm; or apples, pomegranates, and strawberries: we may in the same manner speak of pain; we have no particular or distinct idea in the imagination annexed to it, until we have, from amongst various species of evils,

selected

selected a particular kind ; a disagreeable
 smell, a grating sound, the death of a
 friend, the rigors of cold or burning.
 Nothing can be more obvious, than that
 these evils do not differ from each other,
 as greater or lesser of one kind, but as
 evils of different kinds ; the truth of
 which is not the issue of reasoning, or
 matter of hesitation ; it is the perfect assu-
 rance of sense and feeling, of which I
 request my reader to satisfy himself per-
 fectly, at his entrance on the theory of
 man, and try if the slightest reflection on
 the pleasures and pains I mentioned, does
 not convince him without liberty of doubt-
 ing, that they are of different kinds.
 If this be a point then evident to sense
 and feeling, it is certain, that Mr. Locke
 contradicts the clearest intuitions of
 the mind, when he asserts that whatever
 delight or molest us are, on the one
 side, different degrees of the same thing
pleasures,

pleasure, and on the other, different degrees of the same thing *pain*; and that he is under the same mistake, when he calls pleasure and pain simple ideas.

5. To conceive the vast extent of these words, and the prodigious distances by which the various species of pleasures and pains are separated, we need only recollect, that pleasures and pains arrive to the mind, by every one of the senses. Some of the sources of pleasure may be wholly stopped up, and a species of delight interrupted by the want of a sense; so that we can have no idea whatsoever of that kind of pleasure, while the rest remain perfect, within our knowledge and enjoyment. The glory of light, and the beauteous variety of colours, can have no existence in the imagination of a man born blind. The melody of music, and the charms of the human voice

voice, are not in the possessions of a deaf man. However wide and various the extent of the senses be, there is still a more distant order of pleasures that depend remotely upon the senses, and are called intellectual pleasures.

6. The manner in which we acquire a knowledge of pleasure and pain, will direct us to the real particular species, that give occasion to the general names. We never feel any but particular pleasures and pains. An infant feels hunger, thirst, cold, and sickness; by advancing his hand too near a candle, he burns himself; when in course of time he comes to learn language, he is taught to give these, and all other offensive sensations of different kinds, the name of *pain*, just as he learns the use of other general expressions: pain at large then is nothing
else

else but those different sensations. Let us suppose a statue, gradually endowed with life and the human character, first receiving indifferent perception, such as glides over the mind in a revery or inattention; in which state it is devoid of a principle of pain: let it be next roused from a state of calm perception, by the appetite *hunger*; here is one door opened for pleasure and pain, altho' there be nothing distinct from the mere appetite introduced into the breast. Yet what are understood by the words *pleasure* and *pain*, *self-love* and *self-interest*, have already found footing there. Let there be added further, the whole groupe of human passions, appetites, and aversions; you have then before you the selfish creature man; and you see a creation made of the love of pleasure, and aversion to pain, altho' in fact, there is not existence given to any thing, beside
the

the human inclinations, averfions, and fenfations; fuch as hunger, ficknefs, thirft, love, pride, ambition, &c. The love of pleafure and averfion to pain then is nothing different from the various inclinations and averfions we feel.

The love of pleafure, and averfion to pain, cannot therefore be principles of action in the mind, nor indeed have any exiftence there, but as general terms. Here I muft expect an outcry againft me, from the whole race of felfifh philofophers. Are not the love of pleafure and averfion to pain, the original principles, and radical ftems, from which the paffions, appetites, and inclinations, vegetate, and the hinges on which they turn? If my indulgent reader will pleafe to give his attention to the laft paragraph, he will find fatisfactory proofs, that the appetites and inclinations do not
spring

spring from the love of pleasure or hatred to pain, self-love, or interest ; seeing that pleasure, pain, self-love and interest, depend themselves ultimately on the passions and appetites ; that is, we are not hungry because we love pleasure, nor because it is our interest to eat. Hunger is not the effect of judgment, or choice ; it is involuntary. the truth is, we are pleased with eating because we are hungry, and not hungry because we are willing to be so, or have discovered that it is our interest to nourish the body with food. We may say in the same manner of thirst, of love, of ambition, and jealousy ; they are not the effects of design and choice, they proceed not from our love of pleasure, or self-interest ; but our interests, our pleasures, and pains, are formed by them.

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The whole difficulty of conceiving what I say, consists in distinguishing clearly, between general and particular expressions. Are we not sensible of such motives in the human breast, as *pleasure* and *pain*; and does not every one feel them, says a modern philosopher? Yes, just as there are in the world such things as *trees* and *fruit*; and every one who does not want his sight, sees them; but the word *tree* does not mean any thing in nature, distinct from the various species of trees, nor the word *fruit* any thing distinct from the various kinds of fruit. In the like manner, there are such perceptions as pleasure and pain; we all feel them, when by those words you mean to make a general expression for the particular pleasures and pains we have experienced; abstracted from which, they are mere sounds, that have no reality

lity in life, but less than sick mens dreams.

7. From what has been observed, it is obvious that it can no more be said with propriety or truth, that pleasures and pains are the first springs and movers of human action, when we have not a tacit reference to the particular species of pleasures and pains, than it can be said, that we make a fire of wood in general, without any particular species of wood : and as it is neither self-love, nor a love of pleasure, makes an infant eat when he is hungry, or drink when he is thirsty, but the appetites ; by looking closely into the motives of human actions, we shall find those universal passions, that make such a parade in modern philosophy, wholly useless and inactive ; and that all the operations attributed to them, are really performed by ambition, envy, pride, and the other particular inclinations and appetites of the human breast.

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8. Philosophers, in framing of systems, generally take care to have a potent principle in reserve, to perform all their drudgery, and extricate them out of all difficulties. The Peripatetics had their *substantial forms*; the adepts in the animal motion have their *animal spirits*; the eternal drudges of modern philosophy, are *self-love* and *self-interest*: but any one who has read the foregoing lines attentively, must observe, that there is no necessity for supposing the existence of self-love as an universal principle; and that while we have natural appetites and passions to impel us, if we suppose the universal agency of self-love, we admit a double principle, without any occasion. Hunger alone is undoubtedly sufficient to impel a man to eat, and thirst to make him drink; what need then of looking out for any other original

original principle, to persuade us to eat and drink.

9. If we suspend our prejudices a moment, and look at the man of nature, we will soon discover the truth in this case. We find ourselves, and see others blindly and involuntarily impelled by the force of inclination or aversion, which we feel equally, whether the enjoyment we seek be for our interest or no: nay, tho' we see plainly our ruin depends upon it, we still feel the desire, and often plunge deliberately into destruction with our eyes open. But, says Mr. Locke, this is the force of present desire or uneasiness, acting against our deliberate interest, and the greater visible good; it is, I own it: therefore we are not always determined by deliberate self-interest, or the kind wishes we have for ourselves, but must have some other motive, and a strong one, that is thus able to insult and depose self-interest.

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If Mr. Locke had proceeded a step farther, he would have discovered the truth, that the present uneasiness or desire is formed by the natural inclinations and appetites, the true springs of human actions.

It is plain, that if self-love or self-interest ultimately formed the springs of action and plan of life, we would never give up our ease and content, nor suffer the growth of pride, of anxiety, jealousy, nor envy, those torturers of the human breast. When the modern philosophers put self-interest at the head of the passions, they formed a labyrinth, from which they were never able to extricate themselves; and put themselves under the necessity of making a variety of forced and painful evolutions, and countermarches in their system, to account for the eagerness with which men plunge into the way of cares, fatigues, and disappointments; and for their eternal tendency

dency to forsake peace of mind and content, and act with their eyes open against their interests. The selfish philosopher is obliged to shew us, how self-love distresses us with compassion, and makes us take part with the unfortunate; how it betrays us into the inquietudes of love, and tortures of jealousy; how it makes us in the midst of despair, even then, eagerly foster and indulge the devouring passion: he is obliged to explain how interest inspires the yet innocent virgin's bosom with a tenderness, whose end or gratification she does not comprehend; and he must suppose that the same motive whets the appetite for food, to repair the decays of the body, altho' we be not conscious that we are the projectors of the appetite, and know as little of the causes of it, as we do of the œconomy of the stomach after we have eaten. The truth is, we know, by the clearest intuition, that neither the appetite for food,

nor the tender passion, are designed or calculated by us ; on the contrary, we are not surer of our own existence, than that they are involuntary emotions ; and if neither self-love nor self-interest be the motives of those desires, which preserve our own being, or the continuation of the species, it is in vain to suppose that they are the primary springs of any other passion or appetite.

10. It is very carefully to be attended to, that I do not deny the reality of *self-love* and *self-interest* : my view is only to reduce those words, and the ideas annexed to them, to the exact standards of nature, and to that part they really act in the human mind. All the signification we can attribute to the word *self-love*, is, that we our ourselves feel our own inclinations and aversions, and are stimulated by them. The word *love*, when directed to external objects, has quite a different meaning from the same word applied

plied to *self*: properly speaking, love signifies an inclination of the mind to enjoy in some manner, an external object; in this sense, we cannot love or desire ourselves. What is called self-love is very foreign from this idea, and means no more than that we feel our own desires; that the impulse or inclination has a certain determined final end or object, which when attained, the uneasiness of the desire ceases to goad the mind, and we are restored to our former ease and tranquillity; but we feel not this impulse, because we do love ourselves; self-love ought therefore to be distinguished from the inclination that attracts us to external objects. In fact, mankind are so far from finding attraction or complacency in themselves, that they fly their own conversation, and industriously disengage themselves from their own company, by plunging into amusement and crowds: even those who are fondest of solitude, employ the imagination on fo-

reign and external prospects, on schemes of grandeur, poetic scenes, or dreams of love. But when they lose the view of these, and such pleasing visions, they are as miserable as the rest of mankind, in a lonely and self-accompanied state.

II. There is also a principle of *self-interest* in the human breast, to which most of our actions and our plan of life is to be referred; but it is a subordinate principle, and very different from the all-comprehending self-interest that appears in the system of the selfish philosophers. The true account of it is as follows: man, who is a sagacious and observant animal, draws general observations and conclusions from the past part of life to the future, and models his present conduct to supply the calls of his hunger, thirst, pride, and of his other passions and desires, for the time to come. A provident scheme of operations,

ons, that has in view our inclinations, appetites and aversions in future life, is properly called self-interest: but this self-interest of the man of nature presupposes the existence of the appetites of the mind and body, and is subservient to them. If the appetites cease, self-interest and self-love have no longer any existence or meaning. Let pride, and the troublesome sensations of cold and heat, be no more felt by our species; in such case, half the sources of self-love and self-interest are stopped up; our desires of dress, or even of covering, of distinction, and agreeable accomplishments, are extinguished; and so far should we be from affecting palaces, or fine houses, that hardly any one would be at the trouble to build himself a hut, and we should return back to sleep under trees, or in caves. If you would nearly take away the other half of self-interest, let hunger and thirst be known no more, or let food,

in its utmost perfection, grow to our hands, and only give us the trouble of pulling it off from the bended bough. In that situation, the miser would take no more pains for gold, than at present he does for broken bits of glass or tinsel; and self-interest would vanish like a river whose fountains are dried up. Self-interest is distinguished from the appetites and inclinations, as the fore-sight of a passion is from the present impulse of the same passion; it is therefore more calm, moderate, and deliberate; it takes scope for a regular plan of life: at a distance we view sedately the objects of our appetites and inclinations, and are able to make a tacit balance and comparison, in proportion to their greatness and apparent value, and to form our conduct accordingly: this power of balancing good and evil, present and future, while the mind is sedate and free, is the material part of what we call *reason*: but this even
and.

and regular plan of conduct is always disturbed by the exorbitant pressure of the present passion or impulse, which, like a mighty current, drags us perpetually out of the course of reason, in the voyage of life; whence it is, that those who indulge the present passion, at the expence of future happiness of vastly greater extent or duration, are said to act irrationally; that is, they have not made a balance in their own minds; or if they have, they determined in favour of the lesser pleasure, because its influence is present; or, to speak in Mr. Locke's phrase, because it is just now attended with uneasiness. Real self-interest then, is evidently a subordinate and dependant principle, that owes its existence to the appetites and passions. The self-interest I would explode, is that of the selfish philosophy, which is supposed to be in human nature the primary spring and first mover of our actions; and in that frigid
system

system is looked upon as the parent of the passions. When we have discovered that the self-interest that obtains in nature, is only the calm desire of making provision for our passions and appetites, then the inclinations that impell us to action appear; the plan of human nature, opens to view; we see why men step coolly and considerately into vice and toil; and we get a glimmering of the capricious part which reason generally sustains in the drama of life.

12. Having enquired into the true value of the words pleasure, pain, self-love, and self-interest; I must add, that they are useful terms in conversation and philosophy, when they are confined to their intrinsic meaning and value. Self-love is that secret, involuntary, impressed force of unknown superior power, by which the passion or appetite impels us to the enjoyment of the object of satiety, or drags us from the object of aversion;
and

and self-interest is a provident preparation for the entertainment and satiety of our passions and appetites, at a future regale: but these terms have been wrested out of their natural import, to make a foundation for a wretched, debasing, and unnatural system of philosophy, that has clouded common sense, and in theory darkened the clearest intuitions of the mind; that by a kind of magic peculiar to itself, has reversed the order of Nature, and sent men in a circle, to deduce the motives of the human heart from general and relative ideas, that themselves depend on those very motives.

13. Let us make the distinction clearly, and set their exact limits to the terms, *pleasure*, *pain*, and *self-love*. In observations and discussions, we may substitute the general terms to particulars,

lars, and attribute human actions at large to a love of pleasure and aversion to pain, just as we say, that fruit are the production of fruit trees. The truth is, in accounting for the whole of human actions, we are obliged to place them to the account of generals, and not to particular appetites or passions, because they are not the effect of any one passion, appetite, or aversion, but of a great many; but when we speak of particular effects, and treat of particular actions, we must quit general and indistinct principles, and single out the passions or appetites that influence men. It would be equally obscure to attribute the conduct of *Cromwell*, or of *Sextus Quintus*, to self-love, or to a love of pleasure, which was really the effect of their ambition, as to attribute the peculiar taste of a pine-apple to the general nature of vegetables. Here we may see plainly the true foundation of the selfish system, and where that system

tem swells beyond the foundation. When philosophers derived human actions in general from a love of pleasure and aversion to pain, the audience assented, because the effects of a variety of motives in a general view, could only be attributed to an abstract or general idea, comprehending all those motives; but when they proceeded to trace the particular actions and sentiments from the love of pleasure and aversion to pain, from self-love, or self-interest, then they set the shadowy factitious verbal representation, in the place of the real cause. There is little need of further illustration to a point so plain: when we say that fruit is the produce of fruit-trees, we speak very intelligibly, because there are many kinds of fruit-trees; but should a traveller, in a description of the Indies, tell us, there is a certain vegetable there called a *fruit-tree*, that bears pine-apples, nutmegs, pistachio-nuts, dates, oranges, cocoa,

cocoa, mango, pomegranates, and a vast variety of other fruit, of different forms, relish, and flavour ; some fit for one use, and some for another : that the leaves, bark and blossoms, as well as the fruit of the Indian *fruit-tree*, differ widely in texture and quality ; no person would judge this a just and proper account of the fruit-trees of India ; yet such exactly, and equally exceptionable, is the selfish philosopher's system, by which he attributes the various effects of the human inclinations, aversions, and appetites, to the love of *pleasure* and hatred of *pain*, which, like the word *fruit-tree*, are only general terms.

14. The difference between attributing human actions to the general love of pleasure, and aversion to pain, or to self-love ; and attributing them to the passions, appetites, and various species of pains of mind and body that distress our kind,
does

does not appear upon a slight view, as wide as it really is. If the primary spring of our actions be selfishness, and interest be our ultimate view, then is man always, and necessarily, under the direction of apparent reason. For his own sake he chuses always what seems to be right; and right and wrong are only names for a true and a mistaken interest; vice is only a name for innocent error, for misfortune, and a wrong judgment; and all our lofty ideas of virtue, of truth, of fidelity, of gratitude and humanity, all the props of morality and natural religion, sink at once: Goodness is but exact calculation; and man, however specious his pretences be, appears no more than an animal of more extensive cunning, without real dignity or worth, but that of being more potent than his dumb and unfociable neighbours, the wolves and horses.

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Every one, whose sentiments are not wholly dislocated, and new set by system, finds this last, too harsh a conclusion; the generous feelings of men rebel against the doctrine they hold in theory. Many have acknowledged the prevalence of self-love and self-interest, who have denied that they are the principles of virtue or humanity; but they never went to the bottom of the error: they allowed self-interest to be the mean spring of the appetites, and of most of the passions; they only excepted virtue, and gave it a nobler origin. Their arguments are undoubtedly good in this reserve; but while they allowed the agency of self-love, as the first mover and cause of any of the human appetites or pursuits, they became only the jest of the adverse party; for if you allow besides hunger, a second cause, *self-love*, to make you eat, why should not you allow self-love, as a second cause besides compassion, to make
you

you relieve the distressed? If it be answered, that hunger terminates in our own support, I own there would be something in this objection, if men had calculated and created the appetite for their preservation; but children who are hungry before they know the purpose of nature in the appetite, are actually as disinterested in eating when they are hungry, as the tender-hearted and humane are in relieving the unhappy and miserable, whose distresses make them uneasy, and melt them into tears. I have often with pity beheld the friends of virtue struggle in vain against materialists and selfish philosophers, while they admitted the principles of self-love or self-interest to actuate the breast of man in any case.

15. When we turn our views to the real motives that actuate the human heart, we see vast revolutions take place in the theory of man: we see the subtle, unin-

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telligible, selfish system, and a variety of infidel principles that hang upon it, vanish like a cloud; and instead of these phantoms, we see the original human passions, appetites and aversions arise to view; the most sublime object in nature, the human mind, emerges out of obscurity, and presents to us objects of amazement and grandeur, beyond the reach of description, that move us by the feelings of our own hearts: and what is of inestimable importance, we shall probably in the human plan, if we trace it carefully, meet with indubitable marks of our origin, and final end.

The portrait painter, who is desirous to prove that his picture is a just representation, placeth it beside the original, that you may judge of the exactness of the similitude. In like manner, in describing the human motives, if we truly follow nature, the heart itself will in a
moment

moment witness for them, and answer the description. It brings an eternal suspicion on the selfish system, that its explications of the movements and operations of the heart, are subtle and unintelligible: whereas the emotions that we perpetually feel, must in the description appear with the clearest consciousness and intimacy. To this consciousness I appeal; I also hope that it will not appear unreasonable to require *that you must not argue against the reality of a fact, because you cannot comprehend in what manner the fact exists.* You shall not contend with me that you and I do not move while we walk, because we cannot account for self-motion; nor must you say, that I have no memory, because the ideas I do not now think of are no where, and have no existence.

Some further reflections upon the selfish system.

As this is at present the prevalent system, and I am sensible of the enormous power of prejudice against me, I have added some further reflections on my subject, which may have some degree of weight.

1. There are two schemes, either of which may be adopted by the selfish philosopher who is willing to derive human actions from self-love :

First, he may suppose that we ourselves create our sensations of pleasure and pain, in order to our preservation and happiness :

Or, secondly, allowing that our sensations are independant on the will, he may suppose that the memory or remaining sense of pleasures and pains having an influence upon us, as long as it remains strong upon the imagination, makes us choose the good or pleasant, and avoid the bad

bad or painful, and that on this choice our passions turn; for instance, any one, says he, reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent object is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call *love*; on the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call *hatred*.

2. The first of these schemes is too absurd to be assented to by any one, altho' it be absolutely necessary to those who assert that self-love is the main spring of our actions: the second scheme is Mr. Locke's, and it seems to be plausible in general terms; but when we come to particular facts, we shall see it vanish, or fall into inconsistency and contradiction: let us put it to a trial.

Upon Mr. Locke's scheme, it is evident that hunger must be the effect of a

reflection made on the benefit or pleasure of eating ; that when a man has filled his belly with good grapes, and the pleasure of eating them or of eating any thing else is fresh on the memory, he will then have the greatest appetite ; and that in proportion to the time he is fasting, and that the idea of the pleasure has been receding off his memory, the appetite for them must decrease : it also follows from this scheme, which supposes the love to follow from the perception of pleasure, that before young men or women fall in love, it is necessary they should lead impure lives ; consequently that no person in a virgin state could feel the tender passion ; and that after the nuptial happiness, the ardours and desires of lovers should increase ; all of which are contrary to fact, and demonstrate that our passions and appetites do not arise from our perceptions of pleasure or pain ; on the contrary, there is nothing of which

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we have a clearer knowledge than that the enjoyment, instead of giving birth to the appetite, or raising it, satiates us and that the appetite is just laid when we have eat or drank to our utmost satisfaction, while yet the pleasure is freshest on the memory, which is utterly inconsistent with Mr. Locke's scheme.

3. In fact it is manifest, that it was the utter repugnance of the truth to his scheme, that made him miss the truth when he came so near to it as to acknowledge that it was not the idea of the greatest positive good, or of the greatest evil, that determines the will or creates desire, but the present uneasiness: for of *good, happiness, pleasure, self-love or self-interest*, (for he has shifted thro' all these changes) be the ruling principle of man; by what logick or reasoning can it be supposed, that the lesser apprehended good determines the will more

powerfully than the greater, which may not serve to prove that two pounds are heavier than three pounds, and that twelve inches are longer than twenty-four inches ; when he saw clearly that the greatest acknowledged positive good, and the greatest evil did not determine the mind, but the greatest present uneasiness : it was then very natural to ask the question, What other consideration, beside the greatest positive good and evil, forms the present uneasiness ? the answer is readily found ; the present uneasiness is formed by the present passion or appetite ; and consequently good, pleasure, happiness, self-love or self-interest, are not the ruling principles of man, or the springs of the passions and desires.

It had been happy for man, if pleasure and pain formed the spring-head of his actions, and the memory of good and evil directed him thro' life ; but the human
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state is governed in a very different manner: our inclinations and appetites impel us with tyranny, and the returns they make us in pleasure, are inadequate and trifling; we see and acknowledge the emptiness and vanity of our pursuits, we know with the clearest conviction that they are not worth the trouble; and yet when the inclination or appetite calls upon us anew, we fly, and obey it with passion and alacrity.

S E C T. II.

Of the words motive, impression, and substance, applied to the mind.

1. If men had been originally in a lonely and disjointed state, they must at their first advances to society and to a common language, have struggled with almost infinite difficulties, to make each other comprehend what ideas they annexed to their words. It was easy to fix a name or expression for any visible body
or

or for any attitude that often occurred, and could be readily pointed out. It was not difficult to get a child to call this a chair, that a table; to call one motion *running*, another *walking*, and a third *slooping*. It was also easy to establish names for passions, whose symptoms are striking and manifest to the eye or ear; such as anger, grief, joy; or for those inclinations that determine us to familiar actions, and towards familiar objects; such as hunger and thirst; but how shall a man distinguish by words the slighter emotions of the mind, whose symptoms are transient and hardly discernible, and that terminate in no particular visible object, such as *reflection*, *apprehension*, *disturbance*, *disgust*, &c.

2. This difficulty, however, the invention of man got over, and to unravel the manner of doing it we must recur to a peculiar power in the human mind, of discovering

covering at a glance analogies, similitudes and likenesses in the most distant objects : this fine faculty I speak of, is perhaps the spirit of poetry in the human bosom ; at least poesy derives from it, the whole of its creating power and enchantment ; such as its similitudes, metaphors, and invention ; and this subtile and remarkable faculty it is that assists us to express intelligibly the slightest and most latent emotions of the mind. We may suppose proper expressions found for the visible motions of the body, and for the circumstances of our appetites : these being fixed and known familiarly, we are enabled, by our quick sense of similitude, to apply to every emotion of the mind, however delicate and transitory, the denomination of any sensible motion or circumstance that bears an analogy thereto, however distant in other respects : for instance, *imagine, reflect, apprehend, adhere, disturb* ; which words, and their
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proper ideas, are actual hieroglyphics of the internal emotions of the mind, and become substitutes, by much the same kind of artifice by which a painter, in order to express a passion, paints a face with certain distortions. The painting of the operations of the mind, which do not come under the cognizance of the senses, by words borrowed from objects of sense, is called *metaphor*. It is easy to apprehend from what I have said, that metaphors should be for the most part taken from objects of vision, from motion, and light, whose ideas are most lively and distinct, which is agreeable to fact. From these observations it follows, that the words *imagine*, *reflect*, *apprehend*, *disturb*, &c. were not made use of, because nature in the naming of things, suggested unawares, that sensible ideas are the origin of all human knowledge, as Mr. Locke seems to think; but because the ideas of intellect, altho' equally

equally real, known, and felt with the ideas of sense, cannot be distinctly and clearly pointed out to a person who is learning signs or language, unless they be thus represented by sensible ideas, that readily occur, and bring along with them to the imagination, the analogy that serves to interpret the hieroglyphic.

3. The word *motive*, applied to the idea that determines the mind ; and the word *motion*, applied to the resolution taken, are metaphors ; and the analogy extremely remote. We see that one body striking against another, communicates its motion to that other ; the fanciful and visionary imagination just catches an allusion, between this sensible effect and the determination of the mind by an object that affects it. But the moment you attempt to contemplate the analogy or similitude between the collision of bodies, and the manner in which motives
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affect the mind, it disappears wholly, and you lose it; for the idea did not roll along, nor change place in the mind; it was there, but it did not impinge on it, nor was the mind put out of its situation by the stroke; the idea, which is a real distinct essence or being, having its own proper qualities, has neither solidity nor extension; it has not length, nor breadth, nor resistance, nor motion, nor a capacity for moving any thing. You have an idea in a dream, or you recollect people long dead; these ideas tho' real, are not material, nor are they capable of moving any material being by impinging on it: neither are ideas homogeneous with the mind, as bodies are that obtrude against each other; an idea is evanescent, and its essence, as a great writer observes, consists in its being *perceived*; but the soul is not transitory, and it becomes sensible of its own existence, *by perceiving*. Whence it appears, that
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the analogy between the collision of bodies, and the determinations of the mind, is so extremely shadowy and remote, that the moment you desire to fix upon it as an object of view, and endeavour to find the analogy or point of likeness, it recedes from your apprehensions, and is utterly lost; and that when materialists or fatalists draw arguments from the words *motive*, or *impulse*, to shew the passive or material nature of the mind, they lose sight of their subject, and have not the nature or properties of mind in contemplation, but the qualities which passive, inert matter, discovers in its concussions and motions.

4. The word *impression*, when applied in a proper sense to mind, is equally inadequate and illusive. An impression on paper, or a pedestal, is most legible and plain when new made; it is of a considerably permanent nature, but when obliterated,
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its existence is no more : but the impressions on the mind, however vivid, are, by changing the discourse, or by the wandering of the imagination, immediatedly obliterated, and a new impression succeeds; the new vanishes in turn, and leaves a *charte blanche* for a third impression; those that are out of view, are no where; they are in utter non-existence; yet they are not irretrievable: we can recollect them again, and as it were new create them; thus by a surprizing power of restoring to existence that which had no being any where, memory brings back the impressions of the lost objects and renews an obliterated scene; the imagination by a perpetual vicissitude, demonstrates that the nature of the mind is wholly different from that of a tablet or sheet of paper; that it does not retain the inscriptions made on it, like a *rasa tabula*, but by a law wholly peculiar to itself, that distinguishes it clearly from all material substances. In like manner, the passions spring
up

up and vanish. When love is impressed upon the heart deeply, a sudden voice, the appearance of an acquaintance, hunger, sleep, or the yelping of a cur, annihilates it: the mind loses the impression, and no vestiges of it remain in being: yet the passion, on the first vacant moment, by its return, will demonstrate to you that it is not like an inscription, which being obliterated, returns no more; and it will convince you, that the mind is not like a tablet, or like paper; whence it is evident, that the terms *inscription*, *imprinting*, *impression*, and such like, applied to the mind, are highly metaphorical and improper, and should be used only in an emblematic and loose sense; and that we must not draw any consequences from these words, or their ideas, in our enquiries into the real nature of the human mind.

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5. The term *substance*, even when applied to body or matter, is a very remote metaphor. It was supposed by certain philosophers, whose opinions came into such repute, as to give a bias to the language of the learned, that besides the simple ideas of sensible qualities, which united give us the idea of body, there is a latent subject of union, different from the sensible qualities, which fixes them, and holds them together. The relation between this unknown ideal subject of union, and the qualities to which it was supposed to give a permanent consistence, seemed to bear some allusion or similitude to that between the *foundation* and the *superstructure*; between a body *supporting*, and a body *supported*; on account of which analogy, it was called *substance*; and when it is said that qualities inhere in the substance, we have an idea somewhat like a mountain with its incumbent rocks and trees upon

upon it: but the metaphor is so exceeding inadequate, and so remote from common sense, that the whole body of the learned in succession, who seemed to have language in their own hands, and actually corrupted it in other instances, have not been able to give this word a currency in that sense, beyond the doors of colleges and closets; for in the common phrase, *substance* signifies goods or chattels.

It is plain, that whether there exists an obscure something, in which the qualities cohere, or no, the analogy I speak of is exceeding remote; and that qualities bear not the same relation to their substance, that a superior body does to that on which it rests; and that the relation between the qualities and the substance, is wholly different from that between the foundation and the superstructure: so that, when we turn our imagination from

the metaphor, and consider the real existence of qualities, we find every idea of substance and of superincumbence vanish into emblem. But the word *substance*, carried on from body, and transferred to mind, as the support of intellectual qualities, is the metaphor of a metaphor; for as I just before observed, neither ideas nor passions reside in mind as qualities do in body; the ideas, the desires and appetites, are of a fugitive evanescent nature, and ideas are themselves real beings, having their own qualities; to call the mind therefore a substance, or an immaterial substance, is to paint the hieroglyphic of an hieroglyphic; which however may be done in common discourse, provided we carry in our minds the impropriety, and do not pretend like *Spinoza* and his followers, to draw any consequences from the term, concerning the nature of the soul.

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6. It is true, we have very clear ideas of motion, and of impulse by which motion is communicated from one body to another. We know what printing is on paper, and engraving on marble; and we easily conceive a horse, or a joint stool, standing under a load. The words *motive*, *impression*, and *substance*, bring familiar ideas to the imagination; but when we take our eye off from the metaphor or emblem, and direct our thoughts to the human mind, those familiar ideas appear to be only reflexion and shade. The very similitude almost vanishes, and we find ourselves receding into obscurity, because it is indeed the obscurity of the objects that force men originally, to betake themselves to metaphor for illustration.

7. There are men who pretend to reflect and reason, who tell you, that they can conceive the mind only as *moved*,

impressed, and a *substance* ; and therefore conclude that it must be actually moved, impressed, and material. These gentlemen speak exactly like children, who seeing the names of the passions printed under their pictures, tell you, that anger, and love, and jealousy, are made of paper and colours, and deny that there are any other, because you cannot tell them the dimensions of anger, the length of jealousy, or colour of love ; whereas, they say our printed passions are clear objects of sense and conception.

7. Let us distinguish what we really know, from what we only imagine confusedly ; the mind is determined, without being moved ; it has ideas and inclinations without impressions ; and it exists, without being substance: the true result of which is, that mind is of a different nature from body, and obeys laws wholly repugnant and unrelated to the laws of matter.

matter. The gentlemen who complain, that when you strip the mind of all motion, inscrip^{tion} and substance, you take away every thing conceivable from it, and seemingly annihilate it, have certainly been imposed upon ; they never had any conception of the mind, and altho' they used the word, and spoke of soul and spirit, all that filled their imagination was, *paper, a tablet, balls in motion*, and such external objects of vision. I need not tell my ingenious reader who is acquainted with Mr. Locke's Essay, that he has made numberless inferences which he applied to the mind, that appear obviously from what I have said, to be applicable only to paper, pedestals, and bodies at motion or rest. These observations are necessary to be made in an enquiry into the nature of the human mind, to keep our thoughts free from metaphors, and emblematic objects, that lead us astray in our reasoning, and to

keep our attention close to the operations of the spirit of man, and to the real laws under which it displays its powers. By a defect, obvious in the very nature of language or of artificial signs, we cannot represent ideas of the mind that are attended by no remarkable symptom, by a proper word. This impediment to language put the genius of man upon the most subtle contrivance perhaps of which he is capable, the substitution of allegorical expressions, where a gleam of likeness is discernible; and now the common use of the most remote metaphorical expressions, makes us take no notice of the superlative sagacity that at first discovered this shadowy similitude; in common use they pass current, because they are often used, and discover our most incommunicable thoughts: but where men in strict reasonings, and philosophic researches, mistake the metaphor for a proper word, they make strange

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confusion in philosophy. I think I may safely assert, that the natural inability of man to express his intellectual ideas, and the abuse of language consequent thereto has led men into greater errors in philosophy, than all the other abuses of language put together.

S E C T. III. *Of Instinct.*

The infant mind at coming to the world, is a meer *rasa tabula*, destitute of all ideas and materials of reflection. It is a *charte blanche*, ready for receiving the inscriptions of sense; yet it behoves us carefully to observe, that it differs from a *rasa tabula* or a sheet of clean paper, in the following respect, that you may write on clean paper; *that sugar is bitter, wormwood sweet, fire and frost in every degree pleasing and sufferable; that compassion and gratitude are base; treachery, falsehood, and envy noble; and that contempt is indifferent to us*: Yet no human
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art or industry are able to make those impressions on the mind: in respect to them, the mind discovers not a passive capacity, but it resists them with the force of fate: the signification of the words may indeed be altered; but when we take our attention off from the words, and place it on the ideas, I mean, that no human power is able to impress the ideas I speak of, on the mind of man, in the order and relation I write them. The infant mind then is justly compared to a sheet of clean paper, in being pure of all ideas, and susceptible of a vast variety; but it cannot be compared to a sheet of clean paper in this other respect, that prior to the impression, they are both equally indifferent to the inscription they are to bear. For the human mind hath several predetermined tastes and sentiments, which arise from a source that lies beyond experience; custom, or choice; that with absolute, authority

authority decides the *good* and *bad* of the ideas we receive.

2. To conceive proper notions of the predispositions of the minds of animated creatures, let us turn aside, and make a small excursion amongst the brute creation, in whom instinct is less disguised and less complicated than in man: Brutes nursed and bred up in the same great common, display very different dispositions, and follow various occupations in life. If they had been all originally of one temper and frame of mind, and had the same directing principles of action from nature, their untutored dispositions would appear for ever the same, and they would differ only according to their various powers of action, nearly as sparrow-hawks do from eagles, as Swift's Houynhms from a nation of philosophers, or as Locke's wonderful parrot from a tractable servant; they would run along one
course

course of life, as large and small waves pursue each other down the same current.

But in the common of nature, and in the same scenes, in woods, plains and deserts, we meet with inhabitants of very different characters and occupations; we meet with tyrants who lay waste the forest, and roam in search of blood: we meet with peaceable colonies, who yet retain the dispositions of the golden age, and feed only on vegetables; and with tribes of industrious labourers, who work in wood, or live by fishing, or by weaving nets in which to take their prey. That the occupations and manner of life of the brute creation, are not the effects of custom, or experience of their powers or capacities of action, but of a predetermined, innate disposition, appears from numberless instances: cocks strike with their legs before their spurs grow, and bulls push before their horns appear:

appear : the puppies of all beasts of prey, while they are yet offenceless and innocent of blood, play and exercise themselves in the arts of destruction ; while the helpless animals, who are devoted to be their prey, practise in unexperienced youth, the shifts of flight and escape. Ducklings just parted from the shell, and hatched by a hen, rejoice at the water, and the moment they come to it, launch thereon with the utmost security, accomplished sailors before they row, or strike the first oar ; young birds hatched in a cage by a step-mother, and brought along with her to a country, where none of the species ever dwelt before, shall not follow the step-mother's plan, or be led aside by acquired knowledge, but if they find materials, build exactly in the model of their ancestors, without the least deviation ; as they never quit the plan of their forefathers, neither do they improve by time and experience,

perience, or perform any work of fancy. No bird was ever known to alter the form of his family-nest, or to contrive a more commodious nursery for her young; nor, as an ingenious writer observes, did any hive of bees ever add or retrench a single angle in the building of their cells.

3. In looking over the instincts of animals, there are two observations we can hardly miss: the one is, that they are the effects of calculation and design, which has so finely adopted them to their powers of execution; and the second is, that this calculation is not theirs. How destructive had it been to the species of ducks, if they had such boldness to plunge into the waves without an oar to strike, or an unknown means of keeping out the water from penetrating their feathers. The prodigious ornament of the lion is but the external part of the design
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of nature, when you discover that the taming of this fierce animal is the most difficult undertaking imaginable, and that his wrath and thirst of blood are not to be subdued, you then see the meaning of the armament of the destructive creature. It is equally remarkable, that in the regular stated actions of very stupid animals, who have hardly any traces of prudence or reflection, we discover an intimacy *a priori* with the most secret powers of nature. Hens and turkies perform operations very familiarly, which after they are known, and become the objects of our enquiry, no depth of philosophy can account for. Shall we say, that the hen and turkey, foreseeing powers and effects, which Sir Isaac Newton could not calculate, nor even explain, undertook the office of hatching? Is it not evident that we must attribute the process to some being, who is acquainted with the seeds of life in the egg, who
knows

knows the powers of heat, and the just degree necessary for warming the embryo into life?

There is no need of heaping instances of an oeconomy, that is taken notice of by every writer of natural history, and occurs to every one in familiar life. I will proceed to lay it down as a general maxim, that it is the common method of nature to direct her animal creation by instinct or unacquired disposition; and from it I draw this undeniable conclusion, that it is equally practicable for nature to direct man as the brute by instinct, or predisposition I do not mean from the possibility to bring an argument for the fact, but only to shew, that there is no violence in supposing human instincts, and that no argument lies against them from the difficulty of conceiving their nature or operation, seeing that the same difficulties remain in force against
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the instincts of brutes, which nevertheless are certain and real.

4. But it must be carefully noted, that instincts and predispositions do not infer innate ideas, rules, maxims, or inscriptions on the imagination. I already observed, that the use of the words *inscription*, *imprinting*, and *impression*, applied to the mind in a proper sense, has led the modern philosophers into great confusion and error. I likewise took notice, that the human inclinations, appetites, sentiments, and even ideas, pass away totally off the mind, and have no existence; yet by their return, they demonstrate that they are not lost like a defaced inscription, and that they are in the mind in a manner very different from a proposition on paper, or an inscription on a pedestal. I own at the same time, there is no conceiving how a man can have a sentiment, a taste for music in his frame of mind, or an idea in his memory, without perceiving them

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there. We see nothing in matter correspond to this property of the intellectual part of man ; yet I must here call to my assistance the axiom I premised, that we must not argue against the reality of the fact, which we intuitively know, merely because we do not comprehend the manner of its existence.

5. When we withdraw our thoughts from metaphorical images, and place them on the real operations of the mind, we find that some instincts of great influence do not appear until certain seasons of life, and certain preordained ideas call them forth to action ; nothing can be more different from the nature of inscriptions on paper or stone : inscriptions are clearest and most legible when they are fresh, but the instincts of animals are sometimes imperceptible in tender youth, and are displayed only when the mind comes to maturity, and the season of passion is arrived ; the mutual inclinations of the
sexes,

Sexes in birds is warmed into a flame by the approach of spring, and every bird then discovers without mistake the object of his engagements : by this observation we are led to take notice of the universal design that runs through the creation, and governs all the animated inhabitants of the earth. The minds of animals are calculated for the objects that in process of time are to attach them ; at the presence of those objects they feel a new desire, which is the secret intelligence of nature, and it is this preengagement that forms their characters and leads them to their different occupations and course of life : it directs the various tribes or species to their peculiar hereditary estates in the common of nature ; it peoples lakes and bogs, mountains and particular trees, with their proper inhabitants, who feel a real *amor patriæ*, that will suffer them to reside no where else ; and this divine intelligence instructs them in their dif-

ferent occupations by which they live, and is the ingenious arbiter of their pleasures and enjoyments.

6. What I have been saying requires the fullest and clearest light, in order to bring us acquainted with the laws of the mind. A modern philosopher objects to me, and says, let us take the following proposition. *s: a trush in the spring courts the company of his mate; a man has a taste for music*; these propositions are formed of ideas, the ideas are not innate, neither are the propositions that are formed of them. I own it, learned Sir, but I neither said propositions nor ideas are innate; on the contrary, I am convinced they are not; and yet it is certainly true that the mind is so framed before the reception of the idea, as upon its appearance to feel a passion, an appetite, or inclination, that was before out of perception, and was neither engraved nor imprinted,

imprinted, so as to be perceivable. The duckling has no original idea of water, yet the moment he descries it, he is moved with a new desire to swim; he flings himself upon it the first moment, with perfect security and before he draws a stroke, is an accomplished rower. The bee has no innate ideas of honey, of flowers, or of wax; yet he is a perfect virtuoso in these matters, and without line or compass, or studying a problem in Euclid, sets out no ordinary geometrician and architect. It is certain that instincts do not require innate ideas, and that dispositions and tastes belong to the mind unperceived, ready to be put in motion by the scene which is to direct their operations.

7. Let us now quit this excursion into the department of brutes, to return to the human system; and let us examine whether or no man has his instincts to

direct him in the concerns of life. I hope that the explanations I have already made, will keep me free from cavils that interfere not with my meaning or design. I am not going in quest of innate characters, nor innate propositions impressed on the understanding; but in order to give the most distinct idea possible of the object of my enquiry, I will quote a passage from Mr. Locke, that comes up exactly to my purpose: “ I deny not that
 “ there are natural tendencies imprinted
 “ on the minds of men; and that from
 “ the very first instances of sense and
 “ perception, there are some things that
 “ are grateful, and others unwelcome
 “ to them; some things that they incline to, and others that they fly: but
 “ this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to
 “ be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice; such natural impressions on the understanding, are so
 “ far.

“ far from being confirmed hereby, that
 “ this is an argument against them ;
 “ since, if there were certain characters
 “ imprinted by nature on the under-
 “ standing as the principles of know-
 “ ledge, we could not but perceive them
 “ constantly operate in us, and influ-
 “ ence our knowledge, as we do those
 “ others on the will and appetite, which
 “ never cease to be the constant springs
 “ and motives of all our actions ; to which
 “ we perpetually feel them strongly im-
 “ pelling us.” It is plain from this pas-
 sage, that he distinguishes between na-
 tural tendencies imprinted on the minds
 of men, which are the constant springs
 and motives of our actions ; and innate
 characters, which are the principles of
 knowledge, and appear in the form of
 rules and maxims : the first he acknow-
 ledges, and only argues against the second.
 Here then, once for all, before I proceed
 to the theory of the human mind, I de-

clare that I think it extremely absurd to imagine that infants come to the world with rules, maxims, principles, or ideas imprinted on their understanding; and that my attempt is only to bring to open light, tendencies or instincts that cannot be acquired by reason, and which are distinguished from principles or propositions in this respect, that no reason can be given for them; and as they are not acquired, they appear to be appendages to human nature, universally felt, that may be traced in every nation and society of men, that ever came to our knowledge, whether savage or civilized.

8. To proceed then, mankind know by instinct the passions on the human countenance, when they become violent, and are not disguised. This is a science so clearly settled by nature, that painters are able to represent the passions with force and life to all nations upon earth

earth, so that the wildest savages the moment they cast their eyes on the picture, shall understand with the utmost evidence, the emotions of mind delineated ; it is because all the race of man know the passions by instinct, that the statues of antient Greece and Rome speak their emotions this day as intelligibly to the travellers of all countries, as they did to the sculptor's cotemporaries and acquaintances. Love, grief, anger, envy, corporal pain, pity, have each their unerring symptoms that discover the agitations of the soul at a glance. It may be alledged, that these symptoms were at first used by accident, and continued after by custom so constantly, that every one learns them, and understands the passions to which they are become signs ; as by use, the words which indisputably are factitious, bring to our thoughts their correspondent ideas ; in short, that the symptoms of the pas-
 sions

sions acquired in youth, and by constant use are become an universal language.

The symptoms of the passions indeed form an universal language well understood ; but they do so, only because they are taught by nature. An artificial language is alterable, and, like all the other works of man, is subject to variation and decay ; and there is no such thing as fixing it for a perpetuity, while it continues in public use. Affectation and novelty will be always busy, making changes and deviations, which altho' slender in any one age, yet, like the slow touches of time, they become sensible at length ; but the picturesque language of the passions has never varied a tittle, nor is it within the reach of human art or power to vary them. Alexander or Cæsar, who governed the known world, were not able to make a laughter pass for a
 sign

sign of melancholly, or a frown for the expression of approbation : besides, every one is conscious of the superior force of the expressions of nature to that of words, and consequently of their difference. It is idle to pursue this argument farther, because hardly any one who can see, will dispute that the symptoms of the passions are both produced and understood by instinct.

The passions also discover themselves by peculiar sounds ; a sigh, a groan, laughter, the piercing cries of agony, and the slow wailings of sorrow, are understood by every ear. There are still slighter emotions, and gentler modulations of sound taught by eloquent nature, that enter into familiar discourse, and are understood by every one without grammar or prosody, that concur much to the charms of elocution, and discover a sensibility of taste. The soft bewitch-
ing

ing tone of love, as well as the smile, give a brief, but a very intelligible account of the heart. Raillery, grief, anger, fear, vary the sound as well as the features, and discover to us, by the light of instinct, the speaker's sentiments, altho' he uses a language we do not understand.

The attitudes and flexions of the body also, strongly express the motions of the mind; whence it is, that orators choose to speak standing, and in a moving posture. These three I have mentioned, the gesture, tone and attitude, form the spirit and soul of language: and if nature had not endowed man with an instinctive knowledge of them, he would be hardly capable of speech: the use they are of to us, in rendering us intelligible to each other, and smoothing the way to language, may be observed in the gestures and modulations of children, who come slowly to the power of speech,
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and of strangers who endeavour to converse and become intelligible, without understanding each other's language ; for in such cases, necessity brings them back to the principles and elements of natural expression.

9. There is nothing has puzzled philosophers more than the peculiar marks and diagnostics of the human species : it is not that they are unknown, or that they are not obvious ; it is manifest that every one perceives and knows them by the ability of every one to distinguish a man ; but the difficulty lies in selecting out those universal marks. Is it not surprising, that however easy this task appears, the whole succession of philosophers missed of it, and were not able to tell what every clown and savage easily perceives ? In short, the distinguishing marks of the species, are the symptoms of the human mind appearing in open view,

view, in the countenance and gesture, modulating the voice to the hearer's conscious feelings, and painting to both the senses, if I may say so, the well known emotions and sentiments of the mind : untaught instinct discovers them, and these being found constantly joined to the human shape and countenance, and being naturally expressed by them, as I just observed, the shape and countenance serve, as a label does on a grocer's chest, to let us know the repository of the human mind, even altho' sleep at present seals up the man's intellects. It is here proper to observe, that human madness or folly are peculiar to the mind of man, and characterize it equally with its calm common sense. Its pride and ambition appear as real under a crown of straw, as a crown of gold. Its passions, its gesture, and characters appear as distinctly in Bedlam as at a city committee ; and in the extravagance of a mad-man, we know
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the human mind disconcerted and out of arrangement, with the same certainty; that we know household-furniture in the ruins of a house that has been overturned by a storm. Gesture and modulation are more preserved in the languages of the south part of Europe, and in the same climate round the earth, than in the climates to the North; the cause is unknown, but the effect indubitable, which forbids oratory to arrive at the same perfection, or to have the same powers here as in Greece and Rome. For the same reason, pantomime entertainments are the growth of Italy and exotics in our cold climate, like their oranges; but altho' the northern inhabitants want the expressions of nature, they have not lost the taste; as men who are themselves no poets, are sensible of the beauties of poetry: whence it has happened, that while the northern critics cease not to ridicule the silent conscious expressions

expressions of pantomime, their women, children, and the illiterate, who are happy in knowing no rule but the rule of instinct, flock to those exhibitions of the soul. I am here persuaded to give a hint that I think may be useful to preachers, lawyers, and others who are destined to speak in public; it is, that they often practise before a glass or good judges, the pure expression of nature, free from the bluster and confusion of words, and fix an habitual propriety and grace of gesture, which few of our countrymen are happy in.

II. Music, with a superior power that is not acquired, and cannot be resisted, seizes on the human mind, and opens the springs of the passions. The effects of music is the subject of the finest lines in our language; my reader of taste is sensible I mean Dryden's Feast of Alexander. We comprehend by instinct, without the assistance of reason, that
music

music is related to poetry. The principal object of both, is something beyond conception rapturous and elevating; when we would fix our view upon it, we find that it lies yet below our horizon, and only appears in a dawn whose splendor surprises us; accordingly, there is a perfection, *a plus ultra* still behind, beyond expression and attainment in both, of which great poets and musicians have a confused idea, without ability ever to arrive at it. But altho' they know it not, they are sensible when they approach to it, by the noble elevation that seizes the soul, the raptures in which it struggles as it were to get loose, and approach to the unknown object, that seems at the same time to appear and hide from the imagination. Music, like poetry, hath its tragedy and comedy, and often a fantastic mixture of both; which latter seems to be the present taste.

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Music,

Music, like all sciences whose standard is in nature, can only be corrupted by the professors, or the learned in music, because the sense of the untutored part of mankind is the true standard, and can never be wrong; but the learned are always liable to be corrupted by vanity and affectation: the same thing happens in eloquence; the sense of the croud is the true standard of eloquence; yet from the time oratory became an art, it has been seldom free from the false beauties of the learned in oratory. The true beauties of music affect every ear that is not corrupted by art, but the masters are often led by a false emulation of displaying a master-hand, to introduce what may properly enough be called the puns and quibbles of music; these they at present cultivate with great care and perseverance, while they neglect the wild graces, the nobly plaintive strains, the sounds that charm and elevate, that as-

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suage the petulant cares of this life, that wrap us in golden visions, and bring forward lofty passions, which we never knew before, and now perceive in song with surprize and ecstasy.

There appears little reason to judge that our instinctive taste of music has been communicated to any other species, or is any other than a charm relative to the human mind, and confined to it. Every species of bird who sing, have, it is true, their own hereditary strain, at least sufficient to distinguish them to the other sex within the species; but however we admire the variety of the song, yet it is not music to us, altho' it be to them the irresistible breathing of the voice of love, that melts them into passion, and distinguishes the lover, ordained by fate for the nuptials.

12. The transition from music to beauty is easy and natural. Beauty is not ab-

solute no more than music, but relative,
 and the well known symbol of pre-ordained
 union. Every creature finds the object
 of desire in his own species; and there
 are few temptations to transgress those
 bounds: an appetite indeed of mind
 or body, may be depraved or warped in
 a few instances, but it never can be lost
 or altered, nor yet so far misled to a
 wrong object, as not to leave the inten-
 tion of nature very clear and obvious.
 Man does not discover the beauty that
 gives birth to passion, until both him-
 self and the fair arrive near the summit
 of youth. I am obliged to be the more
 explicit on this inclination that unites
 the sexes, and ensures the continuation
 of the species, because it clearly decides
 a point of the utmost importance to
 be known in the theory of man; it is,
 that the natural springs of human actions,
 altho' they be the instinctive impressions
 of nature on the breast, yet they are not
 impressed

impressed strongest on children; and some, for instance this I speak of, do not appear until after a considerable advance in life. Man beheld beauty and a good air from his infancy, but the unutterable elegance that forms the soul of beauty, and kindles tender desires, lay hid from him in puerile youth. What is this grace which lovers and poets feel while they mourn their inability to express their thoughts? It is the conscious symptom of the season of life, intended by nature for the human nuptials, when the passion just opening into bloom in the breast, seeks for an object of its tenderness, and throws resistless embellishment and softness over the manner and expression; these symptoms are best understood by savages, but they are more affected and practised by polite nations, who imitate the graces of nature, and make them submit to established rules of art. Altho' this conscious grace generally fades

and dies along with the season of passion, yet in some women it is fixed by education and habit, and communicates a tincture of beauty and softness to the actions, until old age utterly defaces it.

It is sufficient to my present purpose, to shew in a few instances that man hath his instincts, his natural directions, and innate lights, which depend not on deduction, design, or reason; but are the revelations of nature, made to him by a silent notice to his heart, without pains or reflection; and that these tacit revelations form his common sense, his character, and course of life. A man's sense of beauty confines him sufficiently to the mother and nurse of his species, and the kind companion of his cares; the sympathy of countenance and gesture, and the innumerable flexions and modulations of his voice, both expressive of
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the human mind, discover to man his society, and form the out-strokes of language, which is the chain that binds together the members of the great leviathan.

13. We find then that the minds of animals in regard to the instincts or primary springs of action, are very improperly compared to a *rasa tabula*, or sheet of clean paper: but in an infant state, they may be more justly compared to the nearest image of animated life, a tree. In winter, naked fruit-trees of different species seem little distinguishable; but when spring and powerful suns invigorate them, and call forth their innate properties, then different kinds of blossoms leaves and fruit appear, whose existence were before unperceivable. Thus the instincts and dispositions of animals that lie unperceived in the infant mind, open and appear in the active and destined sea-

son of life, when their respective objects call them forward into operation.

Instinct appears with various degrees of clearness and certainty in various animals; in bees, ducks, and perhaps in most insects, it is decisive and perfect at their entrance upon an active life; in dogs and other animals that approach the human sagacity, it is at first obscure, and requires an exercise and discipline which they naturally fall into, to bring it to perfection; in man, instinct is more latent, complicated, and restrained by opposite and irreconcilable desires, and therefore more liable to be perverted, mistook, or misled by habit; yet its intelligence throughout the species will for ever remain clear enough to shew its end, and the views of nature.

14. However obvious instinct appears in the actions of animals, and in determining

mining their characters and course of life, it finds no room in modern philosophy. The instincts of the brute creation are equally inconsistent with its principles, as the instincts of men: this observation is sufficient to make an unbiassed person strongly suspect, that the modern system of the human mind is imperfect, and in fact, while the current philosophy treats with minute and tedious exactness of sensible ideas, which are only fortuitous fugitive objects in the mind, it leaves in oblivion the soul itself: the lights of philosophy are held to us carefully through all the trifling objects of the understanding, and we are committed to utter darkness, where only it is of the greatest consequence to us to have some knowledge.

Whoever has read the forgoing reflections attentively, and is acquainted with Mr. Locke's arguments against innate ideas,

ideas, may easily see that the celebrated dispute he has entered into on that subject is merely verbal, and that the question to be decided with him is, only whether instincts should be called ideas or principles, or should not? If the term *idea*, agreeable to the proper import, be taken to signify the representatives we have in the mind of objects of sense, or our reflections on them, which is the meaning Mr. Locke has taken the word in; then it is certain there are no innate ideas; and indeed the proposition is not worthy of such a formal induction of proofs as Mr. Locke has made, seeing that nothing can be added in evidence clearer than the position itself, viz. *that sensible ideas are derived from sense, and consequently are not innate*. What is said of sensible ideas, holds equally of principles formed of them. Principles made up of sensible ideas can no more be innate than the ideas of which they are formed.

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But then, when we have concluded that we have no innate ideas or principles, it is necessary that another proposition should be established, in order to give men some useful knowledge of the nature of the human spirit; it is, that in the human mind, there are instincts not acquired by sense, and therefore distinguishable from both ideas and principles, that rise into perception and influence, as the powers of the soul open and display themselves. But this most important part of the knowledge of the mind has been neglected by Mr. Locke, and indeed appears inconvenient to his system, and when it is established, his system appears partial and trifling; sensible ideas, of which he so largely treats, are only passengers in the mind, that occasionally take up a short abode there, and pass away; the theory of them is therefore proportionably unimportant; but instincts are the essential distinguishing quali-

qualities of the mind, and the permanent laws of its actions and feelings.

When the instincts of animated beings are taken no notice of in philosophy, and only mere transitory perception is attended to, then no distinction appears in the intellectual creation but the degrees of capacity, or greater and lesser powers, and philosophy becomes barren and unimportant; but when we distinguish animals by their instincts, the various designs of providence appear full in view, and the all-governing spirit acts, directs and rules through the prospect of nature, and gives their separate code of laws to every species on earth, from which there is no appeal. From the human instincts it is, that we may expect to discover, by the light of nature, and by the testimony of analogy, the end and purpose of that great, miserable, and complicated creature, man. I shall only add to what I have said concerning

cerning Mr. Locke's arguments against innate ideas and innate principles, that he has not advanced one syllable against unacquired instincts, and that his reasonings on those subjects conclude nothing against what I have contended for in this last section.

15. Upon the whole, I flatter myself that I have in the foregoing tracts proved, with sufficient evidence, that the system which supposes self-interest to be the parent of the passions, and the ultimate mover of human actions, is a figment and a deception, formed by substituting general expressions which have no ideas or reality annexed to them, for the particular inclinations and aversions which are the real sources of our desires. That the mind is not *moved*, or *impressed* as matter is; that these expressions which are borrowed from material objects, are metaphorical and improper in the highest degree when applied to the mind, and affords no sanction to the usual reasonings of the materialists; on the contrary, that
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the mind obeys laws wholly different from, and inconsistent with the laws of matter; and that the human mind hath in embryo, dispositions, sentiments, and tastes, prior to the impressions of sense, which determine and form the human character and course of life, and that we are by an invisible power, enlightened and led by the hand, whose directions we always feel with sufficient clearness.

Having displayed the errors of those systems that distorted modern philosophy, the way at least is cleared to the sacred springs of morality and virtue, and a path opened to the human plan, which it concerns us so much in this age of infidelity and enquiry, to be perfectly acquainted with.

P. S. Every one who is acquainted with Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human understanding, will readily see that no two systems can be more opposite than his, and this I have just sketched out. When it is proved that the judgments
and



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and common sense of men are directed by instincts, then the design of Mr. Locke's chapters against innate ideas and innate principles is overturned, as well as his whole subsequent system, as far as it is founded on the principles begun in those celebrated chapters, and carried on throughout the whole body of his Essay; self-interest, which, agreeable to his general plan, forms every law that binds mankind, which directs their judgment, and moves them to action, falls to the ground; and virtue and morality must appear under a very different character, and different laws from those which his plan admits. Sensible of the prodigious authority that lies against me, and of the general assent given to Mr. Locke's scheme, I would not venture to oppose it, if I had not the strongest assurance of the truth of the opinions I advance, and a conviction that the cause of virtue and morality is deeply interested in the dispute. With such reflections,
I thought

I thought proper to communicate my thoughts to the public, that they may have a fair trial, notwithstanding any authority upon earth: this is a freedom of examination that Mr. Locke himself has taken, and strenuously contended for.

My intelligent reader will easily foresee, that in the prosecution of this subject, the next attempt should be to enquire what are the instincts peculiar to man, that distinguish him from the other known animals who share this earth with him; whether amongst the human instincts there be any that form fixed and universally felt, fountain-heads of religion and duty; and if it appears that we really have such, then it is evidently of the greatest importance to point them out, and to examine what they plainly infer, and what they teach us concerning the end and destination of man.

F I N I S.

